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A b s t r act
An experiment is defined as a random variable which may
take some posterior probability distributions according to a
marginal probability. Elementary properties of this definition
with respect to information value theory are derived as well
as their practical implications.
1. Introduction
The concept of the value of information is one of the
cornerstones of Decision Analysis [H, R]. It is ordinarily·
presented as a consequence of Bayes' theorem. Now, experiments
may indeed be presented in terms of conditional probabilities,
thus the use of Bayes' theorem, or directly as a random variable
which may take some posterior probability distributions according
to a marginal probability. Equivalence between the two approaches
have long been recognized in the statistics literature (see [B-G])
however the second approach does not seem to have attracted much
theoretical attention from decision analysts in spite of some
practical advantages (see example 1. 4.3 in [R.-SJ).
The objective of the paper is to investigate some elementary
properties of this second definition of experiments with respect
to information value theory. The practical significence of these
properties is also studied.
2. The Value of Information Revisited
2.1 Definitions
Let us first define what shall be referred to as the
classical decision problem.
Definition 2.1.1 The classical decision problem, consists
in the selection of an action among a set of feasible actions
A = {a} given a set of possible states of nature 3 = {s}, a
prior probability distribution on S,
and a utility function u Co,.) defined on Ax 3, with values on
the real line. CA and 3 are assumed finite).
Experiments with respect to this classical problem may now
be defined in two alternative ways.
Definition 2.1.2 An experiment E, defined ln normal form,
consists of a finite set of possible events E = {e} and a matrix
of conditional probabilities Q = {q = Prob {e/s}} E s£Ses e£ ,
Definition 2.1.3 An experiment E, defined ln extensive form,
consists of a finite set of possible events E = {e}, a set of
posterior probability distributions on 3,{Pe
a marginal probability distribution on E,
and
* * * *A = {Ae}e£E A > 0, ｾ A = 1)e e ,e£E
which satisfy for all s£3,
* s sｾ AePe = PO
e£E
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Both definitions are equivalent in the sense that one may go
from one to the other by means of Bayes' theorem.
A classical decision problem and an experiment for this
problem generate what might be called a "derived problem"
(see Chapter 6 in [S]), in which one is interested in selecting
the best strategy, namely an action for each possible event.
Comparing certainty equivalents in both problems and the cost
of the experiment, one then decides whether or not to carry out
the experiment. These practical considerations lead to the
concept of the value of information.
P represents the set of all probability distributions on S.
For all PEP, let u* (0) be the maximal expected utility
associated with the classical decision problem, that is:
for all PEP, u*(p) = Max E
a£A seS
sp u(a,s)
Proposition 2.1.4 The expected value of information, EVI,
associated with an experiment E defined in extensive form may
be expressed as:
E
eEE
ｾ u*(p ) - u*(p )
e e 0
Proof: This is a standard result in Decision Analysis. I I
Assuming a linear utility for money, the EVI may be
interpreted as the maximal price at which one should be
willing to bUy the experiment.
2.2 Comparing Experiments Defined in Extensive Form
Denote by PE the smallest convex subset of P which contains
the vectors {Pe}e£E and for any real valued continuous function
f (0) on P, let Cav f (0) be the minimal concave function*
PE
greater or equal to f (0) on PE. Let EVI (polE) be the expected
value of information associated with the classical decision
problem and an experiment E defined in extensive form.
Proposition 2.2.1
EVI (polE) ｾ Cav u*(p ) - u*(p )
P 0 0
E
Proof: Since u* (0) is a convex function on P as being the point
wise maximum of a set of hyperplanes, its concavification
depends only on the values taken on the boundary of PE' the
concavification of which in turns, depends only on the values
taken on {p } Denote bye e£E'
A = {A = {Ae}e£EIA e ｾ 0, ｾ Ae = 1,e£E
then there exists some AO£A such that
,
* g( ) is a concave function on P if and only if for all
PI and P2 in P and all A£(O,l):
g(APl + (1 -A)P2) ｾ Ag(Pl) + (1 -A)g(P2)
and for all A£A, L
e£E
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D
A u*(p ) >
e e
A u*(p )
e e
By definition 2.1.3 tEA, hence the proposition holds. I I
We shall now characterize the experiments for which (2.2.1)
is in general an equality. Define the P-class of classical
decision problems as all problems for which S and PO in P
remain fixed whereas A and u(e:e) are allowed to vary.
Definition 2.2.2 The experiment E is said to be efficient
if and only if (2.2.1) is an equality for all problems in the
P-class.
Note that the definition is meaningfUl since in order to
define an experiment associated with a classical decision problem
we need only know S and PO that is, the P-class.
Proposition 2.2.3 An experiment E, defined in extensive
form, is efficient if and only if the vectors {Pe}etE are
linearily independent.
Proof: Assume that E is inefficient then there exists a class-
ical decision problem in the P-class such that (2.2.1) is a
strict inequality. Hence the particular AD in A defined in
proposition 2.2.1 and ｾ Ｌ which is also in A, are different.
SUbtracting L
etE
= Po and L
etE
ｾ ｰ
e e
= p o we obtain a linear
dependence relation between the {p} E
e e£ .
Reciprocally, since Po belongs to the convex hull of
{p} ｾ it may be expressed as a convex combination of linearily
e ･ｴｾ
independent vectors {p} E (using Caratheodory's theorem), so
e e£
that ｾ ｦ the set {Pe}e£E is linearily dependent A,contains at
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least two points. It is now a simple matter to construct a
classical decision problem for which (2.2.1) is a strict
inequality. II
Corollary 2.2.4 An experiment defined in extensive form,
is inefficient if and only if at least one of the following
conditions hold
(i)
(ii)
there exists some elEE such that p E PE _ {e }'e l 1
there are more points in E than in S.
Proof: Th:is is an immediate equivalence of the linear dependency
of the vectors {p }
e ee:E.
A typical illustration of the first condition is the
II
case in which for some e1e:E, Pe = PO. Then it lS intuitive
1
that the experiment is inefficient since we may very well end
up with the same posterior probability distribution as our
prior distribution. If p is not too different from PO then
e l
the experiment will remain inefficient. How close it has to
be for inefficiency is made precise by the corollary.
The second condition is more difficult to interpret,
essentially it is a question of dimensionality brought in by
the finiteness of the set S.
Eventually, experiments should be compared in terms of
EVI's. This comparison is easily facilitated for efficient
experiments since then they may be partially ordered indepen-
dently of the particular decision problem in the P-class.
Definition 2.2.5
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An experiment El is said to be more
informative than an experiment E2 if and only if for all
problems in the P-class,
Proposition 2.2.6 For an efficient experiment El to
be more informative than an experiment E2 , a necessary and
sufficient condition is that PE C PE .2 1
Proof: As a simple property of the Cav operator, ｐ ｅ ｾ PE2 1
is equivalent to
for all convex functions f(o) on P. Since (2.3.1) is an
equality for efficient experiments the proposition follows. I I
We shall conclude this section showing how the comparison
of experiments in extensive form 1S related to their comparison
in normal form. The parallel of this presentation with Blackwell
and Oirshick' s study on the subj ect [B-O] will become apparent.
Proposition 2.2.7 For any experiment E, the vectors
Proof:
{p} E are linearly independent if and only if the vectors
e ee:
( I?! - (q ) ) are linearly independent.
'"l,'e - es ee:S ee:E
Denote by R the matrix {ps}· and by T the matrix
e ee:E,se:S
{t:}ee:E,se:s in which t: = P:/A e for all (e,s) in ExS.
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According to Bayes theorem q _ tS e Since for all (e,s)
es - ePa.
* s {Pe}eE:E independentin ExS A > a and Pa > a, the vectors aree
if and only if the vectors {te}eE:E are independent and the
vectors {t} E are independent if and only if the vectors
e eE:'
{qe}eE:E are independent.
may thus replace the set {p} E by the set {q} E
e eE: e eE:
II
in our development. In particular we obtain that an experiment
EI is more informative than an experiment E2 if the vectors
{q } are linearly dependent on the vectors {q} E'
e eEE e eE:2 I
This result was derived directly by Blackwell and Girshick for
experiments in normal form, hence the equivalence of the two
approaches.
3. Practical Implications
The study of experiments in extensive fors lead us to the
derivation of some elementary properties. These properties
may now be used to somewhat simplify the decision analysis of
practical situations in the following way:
(i) if one has to select one and only one experiment
from a given set of equally costly experiments then
proposition 2.2.6 may be used as a dominance criterium
(see section 6-4 in [S] for general comments on the
sUbject) to delete less informative experiments,
(ii) if one has to design an experiment then efficient
experiments have clearly some advantages (in
principle one may "redesign" an inefficient ｾ ｸ ｰ ･ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ
so as to obtain an efficient one by modifying the
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the marginal probabilities), then corollary 2.2.4
offers guidelines; moreover the marginal probability
distribution need not be specified for efficient
experiments since it is uniquely determined by the
requirement
A* P
e e ,
(iii) if one has to evaluate an inefficient experiment
then proposition 2.2.1 gives an upperbound for the
EVI (in this sense it is an improvement over the
well known inequality EVI < EVPI (perfect information),
this upperbound may be derived with less computation
than the EVI : the branches such that p EP
e E - {e}
J"
need not be evaluated, for instance in the example
1.4.3 in [R-S] the experiment is inefficient since
p EP{ }, it may be seen that
z2 zl,z3
Max L A u*(p ) =
AEA z z
ｾ u*(p ) + 1 u*(p ) =
o zl b z3 35.83
whereas the actual EVI is 25.25 and EVPI is 70); then
the knowledge of an upperbound for the EVI may
enable the analyst to cut off some branch in a
decision tree.
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